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The Revenue Act of 1916, with its provision for a tax on the value
at a decedent's death of all property "real or personal, tangible or
intangible,"' spawned the estate tax b6te noire of taxpayers, courts,
and revenue collectors-the valuation of closely held business inter-
ests subject to restrictive agreements. 2 By 1932 the problem was clear-
ly defined. Two federal courts, ending a fifteen year period of ju-
dicial silence,3 examined and determined the status of restrictive
agreements in valuation proceedings. The decisions were diametrically
opposed: one court held restrictive agreements binding for valuation
purposes, 4 and the other found them nondeterminative of actual value.5
Although these antithetical holdings have been the source of recurrent
litigation, legislative reform, and voluminous commentary, the basic
issue remains unresolved.6
This Note argues that the restrictive agreement dispute is best un-
derstood as the product of a general effort to implement two often
conflicting objectives: minimization of tax avoidance by taxing a de-
l. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202, 39 Stat. 777 (current version at I.R.C. § 2031(a)).
2. For discussions of the restrictive agreement problem, see Corneel, Valuation Tech-
niques in Buy-Sell Agreements: Effect on Gift and Estate Taxes, 24 N.Y.U. TAx INST.
631 (1966); O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting, 65 HARV. L. REV. 773 (1952); Sheed, Stockholders' Restrictive
Agreements and Their Tax Consequences, 91 N.J.LJ. 5 (1968); Stechel, Restrictive Buy-
Sell Agreements Can Limit Estate Tax Value of a Business Interest, 44 J. TAx. 360 (1976).
"[I]t is believed that the shares of at least half the corporations in this country are subject
to such restrictions." 2 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTIC § 7.02, at
7-6 n.5 (2d ed. 1971).
3. See Estate of Schulz v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 419, 420 (1928) ("[W]hether a third
party is bound by the price fixed by the directors has not, as far as we know, been
decided and we are not called upon to decide it here . . .)
4. Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166, 167 (2d Cir. 1936) ("[Ain option contract, giving
stockholders a right to purchase at a specified price, upon the owners [sic] sale or death,
limited the value of the stock to the low price at which he or his executors were obliged
to sell it.") (citing Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1932)).
5. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 663, 669 (1931) ("Al-
though the parties can restrict the sale price of the stock as between themselves they
can not, by such a contract, restrict the right of the Government to collect taxes upon
the actual value of the stock.")
6. See In re Cowles' Estate, 36 Wash. 2d 710, 715, 219 P.2d 964, 966 (1950) (describing
restrictive agreement dispute in both federal and state tax contexts: "[Tjhe whole matter
is in a state of discouraging confusion.")
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cedent's estate at its full value and facilitation of succession in a close-
ly held business upon the death or retirement of a stockholder or part-
ner. It contends that the conclusiveness of a restrictive agreement on
estate tax valuation of a business interest should be determined by
an objective appraisal of the enforceability and restrictiveness of the
contract terms, the mutuality of the parties' business interests, and
the net economic effect of the arrangement. The Note recommends
a new test, derived from the insurance and reciprocal trust models,
to limit tax avoidance and ease succession upon the death of a part-
ner or shareholder.
I. Summary and Critique of Traditional Standards
There have been numerous legislative and judicial attempts to de-
velop standards for determining the federal estate tax valuation status
of restrictive agreements. Existing tests do not fulfill either the taxa-
tion or succession purposes underlying the restrictive agreement ex-
ception, and as a result, judicial manageability and uniformity have
suffered.
A. The Statutory Scheme
Under the present Internal Revenue Code and supplementary regu-
lations, any security held by a decedent at the date of his death is
includable in his taxable gross estate at its fair market value.7 Fair
market value is defined as the price at which the stock or bond would
be exchanged in a hypothetical transaction between a willing buyer
and a willing seller.8 When there exists a market for the security on,
for example, a stock exchange or over-the-counter market, the willing
buyer-willing seller test is easily applied: the actual selling price of
the security determines the fair market value.9
In the close corporation context, 10 in which stock is not freely traded,
7. "The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including
to the extent provided for in this part, the value at the time of his death of all property,
real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated." I.R.C. § 2031(a). Shares of
stock, bonds, and interests in businesses as a whole are "property" for estate tax purposes,
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, 368, and are valued at fair market
value, Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(a) (1958).
8. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B. 367, 368. Because fair market
value is considered a question primarily of fact, the Internal Revenue Service will not issue
advance rulings "involving the prospective application of the estate tax to the property
or the estate of a living person." Rev. Proc. 64-31, § 3.02(3), 1964-2 C.B. 947, 950.
9. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(b), T.D. 7327, 1974-2 C.B. 294, 295.
10. "Close corporations" are:
those corporations the shares of which are owned by a relatively limited number of
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measurement of a decedent's business interest for federal estate tax
purposes is a formidable task. The Code provides that the fair mar-
ket value is to be derived from a careful analysis of all available
financial data and relevant factors." The appropriate weight to be
accorded to each factor is basically left to the appraiser's discretion;
the Code requires only that the nature of the company's business be
figured into the calculation of the security's value.' 2 The valuation
of an unincorporated business interest is handled similarly.13
When a decedent's closely held or unincorporated business interest
stockholders. Often the entire stock issue is held by one family. The result of this
situation is that little, if any, trading in the shares takes place. There is, therefore,
no established market for the stock and such sales as occur at irregular intervals
seldom reflect all of the elements of a representative transaction as defined by the
term "fair market value."
Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237.
Rev. Rul. 59-60, however, should not be interpreted as defining close corporations ex-
clusively in terms of a family-held business. R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD, & S. LIND, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 4.02(3)(f) (1979). Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(i), T.D. 7312, 1974-1
C.B. 277, 278, embraces situations in which "actual sale prices and bona fide bid and asked
prices are lacking." The preferred definition was articulated in Brooks v. Willcuts, 78
F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1935):
[U]he term "close corporation," as used in the regulation, was not used in the sense
in which the term is used in the law of England, where it means a corporation
which fills its own vacancies, or in which the power of voting is held perforce
manipulation under fixed and well-nigh perpetual proxies . . . but in accord with
the popular, or vernacular understanding.
11. Under the regulations, valuation is determined by considering the company's net
worth, prospective earning power and dividend-paying capacity, and other relevant fac-
tors, which include
the good will of the business; the economic outlook in the particular industry; the
company's position in the industry and its management; the degree of control of the
business represented by the block of stock to be valued; the values of securities of
corporations engaged in the same or similar lines of business which are listed on a
stock exchange . . . [and] nonoperating assets, including proceeds of life insurance
policies payable to or for the benefit of the company, to the extent such nonoperating
assets have not been taken into account in the determination of net worth, prospec-
tive earning power and dividend-earning capacity.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f), T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277, 278; see Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1
C.B. 237, 238, supplemented by Rev. Rul. 77-287, 1977-2 C.B. 319, 320-21.
12. See Rev. Rul. 59-60, § 5, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 242 ("In general, the appraiser will accord
primary consideration to earnings when valuing stocks of companies which sell products
or services to the public; conversely, in the investment or holding type of company, the
appraiser may accord the greatest weight to the assets underlying the security to be
valued.')
13. Fair market value of an unincorporated business interest is an estimate of the
price at which a willing buyer would acquire the interest from a willing seller, both
having full access to all material information. As in the close corporation context, the
Code supplies only guidelines: the relevance and significance of each factor are to be
decided by the evaluator. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-3 (1958); Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2
C.B. 327, 328. But see Komer, Issues and Problems in Valuing Closely Held Business
Interests for Estate Tax Purposes, Especially Partnership Interests, 30 N.Y.U. TAX INsT.
185 (1972) (because of significant distinctions between stock and partnership interests,
different approaches to estate tax valuation should be provided in Code).
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is owned subject to a restrictive agreement, 14 the foregoing approach
to valuation may be inapplicable. On the general theory that such an
arrangement limits an executor's choice of market for the sale of a
decedent's stock, federal tax authorities will often accord restrictive
agreements significant, if not conclusive, effect in valuation proceed-
ings.'15 Although the stated value in a contract among private parties
does not legally preclude further appraisal for estate tax purposes of
the partnership's or company's actual worth,' 6 it is, in practice, usually
accepted in cases in which agreements with a restriction on dispo-
sition of the interest both during the decedent's lifetime and at his
death represent bona fide business arrangements for adequate and
full consideration.' 7
Even though each of these criteria may present difficulties in ap-
plication, the fundamental problem arises from the inherent ambigui-
ty involved in defining fair market value. That term is susceptible to
two general interpretations: "market value," defined as the price at
which the owner could actually sell his property,'8 and "intrinsic
value," defined as the price one would pay for the "sum of all rights
and powers incident to ownership."' 9 The Treasury Regulations adopt
the first market standard for estate tax valuation of ordinary securi-
ties, 20 apply the intrinsic value standard for closely held or unincor-
14. The term "restrictive agreement" is generally understood to refer solely to limi-
tations on the sale or disposition of stock. However, it "may embrace stock option con-
tracts, partnership agreements, buy and sell agreements, transmutations of property
interests from statutory concepts, conversions of interests in property from one type to
another, and agreements entered into between shareholders or other proprietors of
business or property interests affecting the transferability or extent of their interests."
I J. MERTENs, LAw OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 9.02, at 551 (1959 & Supp.
1980).
There are three basic forms of restrictive agreements. Under a "first refusal" or "first
offer" arrangement, the owner of the stock must first offer it to a specified purchaser
at a designated price before he is free to sell it to others; initiative rests entirely with
the owner. Under an "option" agreement, the specified purchaser is given the right to
purchase the stock at a fixed or determinable price for a specified period of time;
initfative rests entirely with the potential buyer. Under a mandatory "buy-sell" agreement,
the owner is obligated to sell for a fixed or determinable price at a designated time and
the buyer is obligated to purchase; initiative has been taken away from both buyer and
seller. Butala, Restrictive Agreements: Their Effect Upon the Tax Valuation of Cor-
porate Stock, 105 TRusTs & EST. 15, 15 (1966).
15. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958) (detailing circumstances under which option
or contract prices are disregarded in determining estate tax value of securities).
16. See Rev. Rul. 157, 1953-2 C.B. 255 (when close corporation restrictive agreement
does not reflect consideration for goodwill, Commissioner is not precluded, for federal es-
tate tax purposes, from evaluating stockholder's interest in business to include goodwill).
17. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958); Rev. Rul. 54-76, 1954-1 C.B. 194.
18. 2 J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 1020 (1937).
19. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 137 (1929) (origin of phrase).
20. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(a) (1958).
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porated business interests,21 and return to the market standard when
such interests are subject to certain restrictive agreements. 22 This
manipulation of the definition of fair market value and the resultant
grant of special estate tax treatment to certain restricted business in-
terests evince a strong legislative intent to encourage smooth and or-
derly transitions in partnership or close corporation ownership.23
B. Judicial Doctrines
Judicial standards have been developed to interpret the statutory
rules regarding valuation of a decedent's business interests held sub-
ject to a restrictive agreement. Although these standards are often in-
congruous and confined in application to specific factual contexts, the
courts generally recognize, as a starting point, the validity of close
corporation transfer restrictions that are reasonable and contained in
articles of incorporation, by-laws, or shareholders' agreements. The
reasonableness of the restraint on alienation has been judged by
various factors, including the corporation's size,24 the nature of the
21. See id. § 20.2031-2(f.
22. See id. § 20.2031-2(h).
23. A congressional intent to facilitate the continuity of close corporations upon the
retirement or death of a shareholder is expressed throughout the Internal Revenue Code,
particularly in Subchapter C. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 302(b)(3), 306(b)(1) (special exceptions from
taxation at ordinary rates for shareholder's interest when interest terminated by redemp-
tion or another form of disposition); id. § 302(c)(2) (waiver of family attribution rules
for distribution in which shareholder's interest in corporation is terminated and no in-
terest is acquired within ten years of distribution), discussed in SEN. COMM. ON FINANCE,
REPORT ON INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4676 ("insur[ing] a bona fide severance of a particular shareholder's interest in an
enterprise"); I.R.C. § 303 (distributions to shareholder in redemption of stock to pay
federal estate taxes given capital gains treatment), discussed in H.R. REP'. No. 2319, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 380, 428 ("[R]emedial action is desirable
in order to prevent the enforced sale of the family businesses which are so vital and de-
sirable an element in our system of free private enterprise."); I.R.C. §§ 6166-6166A (pro-
visions for deferral of estate tax payment where estate consists largely of interest in closely
held business); id. § 6601(j) (special low interest on unpaid taxes of 4% of first $1
million of closely held business property); see 115 CoNG. REc. 37,902 (1969) (colloquy
between Senators Aiken and Long) (concerning impact on close corporation recapitaliza-
tions of I.R.C. § 305(b)(2) taxation of "disproportionate distributions" at ordinary rates:
[T]here is no intention to alter the [tax-free] status of a recapitalization in which, for
example, the older stockholders exchange some or all of their common stock for pre-
ferred stock and retire from the business while the younger stockholders exchange
some or all of their preferred stock for additional common stock and continue to be
active in the business.)
24. See People ex rel. Rudaitis v. Galskis, 233 Ill. App. 414, 420 (1924) (small corpora-
tion's restrictions on stock transfer held reasonable and valid); In re West Waterway
Lumber Co., 59 Wash. 2d 310, 317, 367 P.2d 807, 811 (1962) ("[R]estrictions that may
pass the test of reasonableness when employed by a small, closely held corporation may
be totally without justification if attempted by a large, widely held corporation.")
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restriction, 25 the designated transfer or option price,26 and the in-
tended business purpose.27 There is, however, no general consensus
as to what constitutes a reasonable restraint on alienation.
Underlying this judicial tolerance of restrictive agreements is the
policy objective of promoting small businesses.28 Because ownership
and management generally coincide in a close corporation, restrictions
on share transferability are essential for the harmonious operation of
the business 29 and for its continuity upon the retirement or death of
one of the initial associates.30
25. See, e.g., Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 542, 141 N.E.2d 812, 816,
161 N.Y.S.2d 418, 423 (1957) ("[W]hat the law condemns is, not a restriction on transfer,
a provision merely postponing sale during the option period, but an effective prohibition
against transferability itself.") Courts consider the extent of the restraint on alienation
in terms of time as well as degree. See, e.g., Tracey v. Franklin, 31 Del. Ch. 477, 484,
67 A.2d 56, 59 (1949) (ten-year restriction on stock transfer was "substantial period"
requiring compelling justification).
26. See, e.g., Security Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Carlovitz, 251 Ala. 508, 510, 38 So.
2d 274, 276 (1949) (restriction requiring shareholder to sell stock at book value regardless
of reasonable market value is void).
27. See, e.g., Lawson v. Household Fin. Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 352, 152 A. 723, 727
(1930) (restriction upheld because maintenance of closely knit group of shareholders es-
sential to type of business being conducted).
28. See Groves v. Prickett, 420 F.2d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1970) ("[B]y-laws restricting
a transfer in closed corporations are sometimes essential to a successful enterprise.");
Mather's Estate, 410 Pa. 361, 369, 189 A.2d 586, 590 (1963) ("[F]amily agreements are al-
ways favored in the law ....")
29. An outside purchaser would have full rights in the management of the business,
regardless of any lack of expertise or possible opposition to the basic policies of the
existing associates. Transfer agreements are also necessary to prevent competitors from
acquiring an interest with the sole intention of undermining the business. For these
reasons, Oliver Wendell Holmes in an early Massachusetts case concluded: "[T]here
seems to be no greater objection to retaining the right of choosing one's associates in a
corporation than in a firm." Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 479, 63 N.E. 934, 935 (1902).
30. There is a real danger that an interest in a close corporation might descend
automatically by inheritance to a family member who either is uninterested in the man-
agement of the corporation or is concerned only with the investment value of the shares.
This inactive shareholder might oppose any corporate retention of earnings, instead pre-
ferring payment of dividends.
The recognition of restrictive transfer agreements as determinative of fair market value
for estate tax' valuation of a closely held business interest promotes the continuance of
the business upon the death of one of the shareholder-partners. Because no established
market exists for closely held shares, there is a danger that the Internal Revenue Service
will overvalue a decedent associate's interest by basing its valuation of property appre-
ciation and goodwill on an overly optimistic view of probable future earnings. Lack of
an established market makes undervaluation of a decedent's business interest as likely
as overvaluation. The effects of each, however, are not symmetrical due to the fact that
overvaluation can potentially force a sale of the business itself. The result may be
dissipation of the estate and a forced sale of the business in order to pay estate taxes,
or, alternatively, a temporary stoppage of business pending a court- challenge of the
Service's valuation figure. Automatic acceptance of a restrictive partnership or close cor-
poration agreement as fixing the taxable value of the decedent's interest eliminates time
and dollar costs, and hence guarantees uninterrupted business operations. See Matsen,
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Although the courts have, in general, enforced contractually valid
restrictive agreements, they have split on the use of such restrictions
in determining the fair market value of the interest for federal es-
tate tax purposes. On the one hand, the courts that adopt an intrinsic
value standard argue that actual market price is not the sole index
of the worth of a closely held or unincorporated business interest,
but rather that ownership is a "bundle of rights, ' 31 each of which
represents value to the owner. They emphasize retention rather than
sale value32 and conclude that a restrictive agreement represents no
more than one of many factors to be considered in estate tax ap-
praisal proceedings. 33 On the other hand, the courts that accept a
Establishing the Price for Closely Held Business Buy-Sell Agreements, 5 J. CoRe. TAX.
134, 136 (1978).
Restrictive agreements serve a number of business purposes in addition to the con-
tinuity objective. See id. at 136-37 (listing possible purposes for buy-sell agreements). Re-
strictions may be useful for maintaining Subchapter S status by ensuring that no share-
holder can terminate the corporation's eligibility either by transferring shares to a non-
qualified holder, for example, a corporation or a trust, or by splitting up his interest
and transferring shares to a number of individuals with the result that the total number
of the corporation's shareholders exceeds the permissible maximum of 10. See 2 F.H.
O'NEAL, supra note 2, § 7.02, at 7-5; Stinson, Terminating the Election Under Subchapter
S, 18 N.Y.U. TAx INsT. 707, 717 (1960). Avoidance of federal securities regulation may also
be facilitated by a restrictive agreement. Such an arrangement permits a close corpora-
tion to fall within the non-public offerings exemption of the Securities Act of 1933, thus
saving the corporation from the Act's registration requirements. See Securities Act of
1933, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1976). Finally, a restrictive agreement fixing an employee stock
option price may result in a deferral of income tax liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d)(2),
T.D. 6540, 1961-1 C.B. 161, 163-64.
31. Maitland, The Mystery of Seisin, 2 LAw Q. REv. 481, 489 (1886) (origin of term).
A restriction or even elimination of transferability will depress but not destroy the value
of a business interest. A buyer might well be willing to pay more than the stated option
price for rights to receive dividends, to vote, and to receive a return upon liquidation,
despite restricted transferability of the interest. Thus, a restrictive agreement should be
no more than an important factor in estate tax valuation proceedings. See Note, Valuation
of Stock Subject to Restrictive Agreement for Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, 60 HARv.
L. REv. 123, 125 (1946) (value of business interest is not determined solely by its alien-
ability, but is sum of all rights granted to shareholder by original contract between
associate and business entity).
32. See United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962);
Estate of Reynolds v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 172 (1970), acq. 1971-2 C.B. 3.
33. The restrictive agreement exception is called off and the factor approach to close
corporation stock valuation is called back on. See notes 11-13 supra (discussing general
factors considered in valuation).
In the gift tax content, the intrinsic value definition governs, and restrictive agreements
are never conclusive for valuation purposes. See Commissioner v. McCann, 146 F.2d 385,
386 (2d Cir. 1944); Rev. Rul. 189, 1953-2 C.B. 294. The failure of courts to adopt a
similar uniform definition of fair market value in the estate tax area can be traced to
a perceived distinction between the effect of restrictive agreements in each situation.
This was explained well by the court in Spitzer v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 967 (8th Cir.
1946):
The value of the shares and the critical time for the determination of value were
fixed by the option contract. In each of the estate tax cases the critical event, the
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sales standard of fair market value look to the actual market in which
a decedent's business interest can be sold. Because a restrictive agree-
ment limits that market, the fair market value of the interest cannot
exceed the sale price stated in the agreement.34
The uncertainty resulting from divergent fair market valuation ap-
proaches has been compounded by the courts' lack of consistency in
determining whether a restrictive agreement is conclusive for estate
tax purposes. A variety of requirements have been imposed to dif-
ferentiate genuine restrictive business contracts from disguised tax
avoidance devices. Most commonly, an agreement must satisfy some
combination of five tests: validity and enforceability; 35 reasonable,
specified, stated or formula price; 30 sufficient restrictions on the trans-
fer of shares during life and at death; 37 underlying bona fide busi-
death of the holder of the shares, which subjected the stock to purchase for a price
stated in the option, had occurred . . . . When the gift was made no one could
predict when petitioner might die, or retire without the consent of the other ex-
ecutive stockholders. The critical event necessary to occur in order to bring into play
the provisions of the contract fixing the price of the stock given by petitioner to
his wife had not occurred .. ..
Id. at 970-71.
34. The Second Circuit in Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1932), first applied
the sale standard to examinations of restrictive agreements' impact on estate tax valua-
tion. It held that a contract granting shareholders an option to purchase stock at a certain
price upon the lifetime disposition of the owner's stock or at his death fixed the value
of the stock for tax purposes at that stated price, because no "willing buyer" would have
purchased the stock for more than its stated option value. Id. at 683-84. This approach
has been followed in a number of estate tax valuation cases. See May v. McGowan, 194
F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1952); Estate of Littick v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 181 (1958), acq. 1959-2
C.B. 5; Estate of Weil v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1267 (1954), acq. 1955-2 C.B. 10.
35. See Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955); Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F.2d 166
(2d Cir. 1936); Estate of Hammond v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 903 (1954), sup-
plemented by 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 83 (1955).
36. A restrictive agreement must specify either a fixed option price or a method for
calculating that price (for example, book value) that is reasonable at the time the agree-
ment was made. See Estate of Cotchett v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 138, 141 (1974)
("In most situations ... a right of first refusal without a fixed price will have little, if
any, effect on fair market value . ... ") Courts look favorably upon provisions in re-
strictive agreements for the periodic adjustment of the stated value. See Estate of Davis,
37 T.C.M. (CCH) 341, 343 (1978).
37. First-offer restrictions on sale of shares have often been held to be the sole index
of the shares' value for estate tax purposes when the restrictions are enforceable both
at death and during the shareholder's lifetime. See May v. McGowan, 194 F.2d 396, 397
(2d Cir. 1952); Slocum v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 753, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The courts
and the Internal Revenue Service have recognized as well the effectiveness of restrictive
agreements in which the option is granted to the corporation to repurchase the stock at
a fixed price. See Estate of Salt v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 92, 99 (1951), acq. 1952-1 C.B.
4. When an agreement fixes the price at death but contains no restriction on the de-
cedent's right to dispose of his property at the best price possible during his lifetime,
however, the property is included in the estate at its full fair market value rather than
at the stated value. See Estate of Caplan v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 189, 192
(1974); Estate of Matthews v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 525, 529 (1944), acq. 1944 C.B. 19.
A narrow definition of restriction is ordinarily used. For example, when a security may
Restrictive Agreements
ness purpose;38 and negotiation at arm's length.39 The first three ob-
jective tests have presented few difficulties. The final two standards,
on the other hand, by requiring judicial scrutiny of the motivations
of the parties creating a restrictive transfer arrangement, have been
the source of endless dispute. Inquiries into subjective intent have
been particularly difficult in view of the high incidence of intra-
family transfers effected by close corporation or partnership agree-
ments.
40
be freely given or devised even though it would remain subject to the agreement in the
hands of the donee, the transfer agreement has been held to be not sufficiently restrictive
for tax valuation purposes. The stated value is "at most a factor to be considered." Estate
of Reynolds v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 172, 191 (1970), acq. 1971-2 C.B. 3. Similarly, when
there is no compulsion to sell or absolute option to buy, a restrictive agreement is not
determinative. See Krauss v. United States, 140 F.2d 510, 511 (5th Cir. 1944).
The requirement of restrictions on transfer both during life and at death is imposed
in the partnership context as well. See United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170, 171 (5th Cir.
1962); Estate of Weil v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1267, 1273-74 (1954), acq. 1955-2 C.B.
10; Hoffman v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 1160, 1179 (1943), af'd on other grounds sub nom.
Giannini v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 285 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 730 (1945).
38. Courts have recognized several valid business purposes for restricting transferability:
(1) preservation of control in a close group, see Slocum v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 753,
755 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Estate of Littick v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 181, 187 (1958), acq. 1959-2
C.B. 5; (2) maintenance of family ownership and control, see Estate of Bischoff v. Com-
missioner, 69 T.C. 32, 41 (1977); (3) continuity of a partnership after the death of any
of the partners, see Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892, 896-97 (10th Cir. 1955); Estate of
Fiorito v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 440, 445 (1959), acq. 1960-1 C.B. 4; and (4) insulation
of assets from potential liabilities, see Green Light Co. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1068,
1071 (5th Cir. 1968); Estate of Mundy v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1778, 1793
(1976); Siegel v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 566, 575 (1966).
39. The valuation provisions of a stockholders' agreement will be disregarded if they
represent a tax device or are substitutes for a testamentary disposition to the decedent's
natural issue. See Estate of Anderson v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 972, 977 (1977),
aff'd, 619 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1980) (dictum). "While transactions involving a family group
should be given special scrutiny, it does not follow that the terms of such transactions
should necessarily be disregarded." Estate of Cotchett v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH)
138, 142 (1974). In fact, in numerous cases restrictive agreements of family corporations
have been recognized as effective for estate tax purposes. See, e.g., Commissioner v.
Bensel, 100 F.2d 639, 639 (3d Cir. 1938); Estate of Macdonald v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1038, 1054 (1951).
Inadequate consideration is the customary indicator of whether or not a transfer or
stockholders' agreement has been negotiated at arm's length. A mere gratuitous promise
to transfer shares to an individual at a grossly inadequate price will void the close cor-
poration or partnership contract. Hoffman v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 1160, 1179 (1943),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Giannini v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 285 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 730 (1945). Other requirements have appeared in the case law, either
separately or as subtests under the general rubrics of bona fide business purpose or
arm's-length negotiation. These include tax avoidance motives, see Estate of Caplan v.
Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 189, 191-92 (1974); Estate of 'Weil v. Commissioner, 22
T.C. 1267, 1275 (1954), acq. 1955-2 C.B. 10; adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth, see Estate of Anderson v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 972, 977 (1977),
aff'd, 619 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1980); and reciprocity, see Estate of Fry v. Commissioner, 9
T.C. 503, 508-09 (1947), acq. 1948-2 C.B. 2.
40. See Commissioner v. Bensel, 100 F.2d 639, 639 (3d Cir. 1938); Estate of Caplan v.
Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 189, 192 (1974); Estate of Fiorito v. Commissioner, 33
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Thus, current judicial doctrines lack manageability and uniformity.
This jurisprudential morass is the inevitable consequence of more
than a half century of vague statutory guidelines and Supreme Court
failure to prescribe the estate tax treatment of restrictive stock trans-
fer agreements.4 1
II. Rationale for a New Theory: The Insurance Paradigm
A close corporation or partnership restrictive agreement is, in ef-
fect, a form of reciprocal insurance: a number of business associates
voluntarily enter into an arrangement whereby they mutually guaran-
tee their investment. Under a reciprocal insurance arrangement, mem-
bers of a partnership simultaneously take out insurance on each
other's lives so that, upon the death of one partner, the others receive
funds as compensation for the financial loss sustained by the business
as a result of the partner's death. Such an arrangement supplies sur-
viving partners with sufficient financial resources to continue the busi-
ness in its existing form. Similarly, a close corporation or partner-
ship restrictive agreement insures against disruption of a closely held
business upon the death or retirement of a shareholder-partner by
restricting transfer of share ownership to other shareholder-partners
of the business, by setting a minimum value for the interest, and by
guaranteeing a market for its sale. From this parallelism between
T.C. 440, 446 (1959), acq. 1960-1 C.B. 4; Estate of Littick v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 181,
188 (1958), acq. 1959-2 C.B. 5. See generally Schwingle, Valuation of a Family Business,
12 TUL. TAx INst. 231 (1963); Note, Testamentary Transfers of Family Partnership In-
terests, 8 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1956).
41. The Supreme Court has not yet considered any case involving restrictive agreements
and estate tax valuation of close corporation or unincorporated business interests. In the
income tax context, the Court has held that shares of stock subject to a qualifying option
agreement may have no taxable value, Helvering v. Tex-Penn Co., 300 U.S. 481, 499
(1937), and that in no case will that value exceed the repurchase price, Helvering v.
Salvage, 297 U.S. 106, 109 (1936). In Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254 (1941), how-
ever, the Court decided that the cash surrender price of a single-premium life insurance
policy does not fix its value for federal gift tax purposes because "the owner of a fully
paid life insurance policy has more than the mere right to surrender it; he has the
right to retain it for its investment virtues and to receive the face amount of the policy
upon the insured's death." Id. at 257.
In contrast, the Court in United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973), emphasized
the sale rather than the retention value of mutual fund shares. Analogizing the case to
those involving restricted close corporation stock, Justice White concluded that the value
of mutual fund shares could not exceed the contractual redemption price. Id. at 554. See
generally Epstein, Estate Tax Valuation of Mutual Fund Shares: An Unrealistic Regu-
lation, 24 HAsTINGs L.J. 241 (1973); Lauro, Cartwright v. U.S.: The Clear Ring of Com-
mon Sense, 49 NoTRm DAME LAw. 643 (1974); Wilkins, The Supreme Court's Cartwright
Decision: Does It Signal New Valuation Disputes? 39 J. TAx. 2 (1973).
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restrictive agreements and reciprocal insurance, a test for federal es-
tate tax treatment of restrictive agreements can be constructed.
Reciprocal insurance arrangements are void unless each party has
an insurable interest in the lives of the others.42 To be valid, in-
surance agreements must be intended to compensate the survivor for
some pecuniary loss, rather than reward him for longevity.43 Under
the rules of the present Code, a decedent's gross estate does not in-
clude the proceeds of insurance policies on his life unless he retained
at the time of his death certain specified "incidents of ownership.'"44
All proceeds of reciprocal policies in which the decedent held inci-
dents of ownership are included in his gross estate. If no incidents
were retained, only the value of his unmatured policies on other
parties is taxable.45
42. See Ducros v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 49, 51 (6th Cir. 1959); Harrison v. Com-
missioner, 59 T.C. 578, 585 (1973); Goedel v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 1, 10 (1939).
43. A tontine, under which a number of individuals procure insurance on each other's
lives with the understanding that survivors "take all," is tantamount to a wagering or
gambling contract and is unenforceable for public policy reasons. In the classic case of
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876), the Supreme Court held
that:
[a] man cannot take out insurance on the life of a total stranger, nor on that of one
who is not so connected with him as to make the continuance of the life a matter
of some real interest to him .... [I]t may be said generally that any reasonable ex-
pectation of pecuniary benefit or advantage from the continued life of another
creates an insurable interest in such life.
Id. at 460; see Colgrove v. Lowe, 343 Ill. 360, 363, 175 N.E. 569, 571 (1931), cert. denied,
284 U.S. 639 (1931) ("[I]t has been uniformly held that a contract of insurance upon a
life in which the insurer has no interest is a pure wager, that gives the insurer a sinister
counter-interest in having the life come to an end . . . ."); Adam Miguez Funeral Home,
Inc. v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 234 So. 2d 496, 499 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (dictum).
44. The term "incidents of ownership" includes a reversionary interest in a life in-
surance policy that exceeds five percent of the value of the policy immediately before
the death of the decedent. I.R.C. § 2042(2). It also refers to the right of the insured or
his estate to the economic benefits of the policy. "[I]t includes the power to change the
beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an assign-
ment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a loan against the
surrender value of the policy." Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2), T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277, 278.
If no incidents are in the decedent's possession at death and if the proceeds of the
policy are not receivable by the decedent's executor, there is no tax. I.R.C. § 2042;
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(1) (1958); see Commissioner v. Noel's Estate, 380 U.S. 678, 684
(1965) (dictum).
45. Insurance held by a decedent on the life of another is subject to estate taxation
under I.R.C. § 2033 as property in which the decedent possessed an interest at the time
of his death. Such policies are taxed at replacement cost, or in the event that they cannot
be replaced, in the amount of the interpolated terminal reserve. Estate of DuPont v.
Commissioner, 233 F.2d 210, 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956). In the case
of reciprocal insurance arrangements, however, in which parties simultaneously insure
each other's lives, the law is not yet settled as to whether the separate insurance contracts
should be disregarded and the proceeds received by the insurers-beneficiaries included
in the insured decedents gross estate under the reciprocal trust rule.
The reciprocal trust doctrine originated in Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940), which held a decedents estate liable for
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The Code makes a series of special exceptions for cases involving
reciprocal insurance arrangements intended for the purchase of a
decedent's closely held or partnership interest subject to a restrictive
agreement. The issues presented for consideration by revenue collec-
tors and courts are the validity of the insurance contract under state
law, the existence of any ancillary binding and enforceable buy-sell
or option arrangements, 46 and the terms of the insurance contract.
Once the validity of the insurance and restrictive agreements is estab-
lished, federal estate tax treatment of reciprocal insurance contracts
is governed by clearly delineated standards that focus on the contract
format and the recipient of insurance proceeds.
If the proceeds are payable to the decedent's estate for the pur-
chase of the decedent's closely held or partnership interest, the pro-
ceeds are included in the gross estate. The value of the business in-
terest is also includable at an amount equal to its stated value less
insurance proceeds.47 However, if the decedent at his death retains
incidents of ownership in the insurance policy, and the proceeds are
intended to replace further payment to the decedent for his business
interest, only the value of the proceeds is includable.48
tax on a trust created by decedent for his brother's benefit as a quid pro quo for
the brother's establishment of a trust for decedent's benefit. The court remarked that
"[tlhe fact that the trusts were reciprocated or 'crossed' is a trifle, quite lacking in prac-
tical or legal significance." Id. at 100. The Lehman standard has been followed exten-
sively. See, e.g., Hanauer's Estate v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 857, 858 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 770 (1945); Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 636, 637-38 (8th
Cir. 1944).
The Supreme Court finally considered the issue in the case of United States v. Estate
of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969). Justice Marshall developed a new test to determine the
validity of reciprocal trusts for estate tax purposes. Rejecting the former standards of
tax avoidance motive and quid pro quo consideration, Justice Marshall held that "ap-
plication of the reciprocal trust doctrine requires only that the trusts be interrelated,
and that the arrangement, to the extent of mutual value, leaves the settlors in ap-
proximately the same economic position as they would have been in had they created
trusts naming themselves as life beneficiaries." Id. at 324. In an unfortunate footnote to
the opinion, however, Justice Marshall stated that the traditional definition of considera-
tion as a "bargained-for exchange" remained relevant under the new test: "In certain
cases, inquiries into the settlor's reasons for creating the trusts may be helpful in estab-
lishing the requisite link between the two trusts." Id. at 324 n.10. See generally Berge,
United States v. Estate of Grace: The Reincarnation of the Reciprocal Trust Doctrine,
17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 436 (1969); Ledden, Reciprocal Trusts: Consideration No Longer The
Cornerstone of Taxability-United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 21 SYRACUsE
L. REv. 357 (1969).
46. If the restrictive agreement is not enforceable or sufficiently restrictive, the re-
ciprocal insurance arrangement will not be given special estate tax treatment. See Estate
of Matthews v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 525, 529 (1944); Rev. Rul. 54-77, 1954-1 C.B.
187; Rev. Rul. 157, 1953-2 C.B. 255.
47. See Estate of Tompkins v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 1054, 1058 (1949), acq. 1950-I
C.B. 5; Estate of Mitchell v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 1, 6 (1937), acq. 1938-1 C.B. 20.
48. See S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL, & H. GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANS-
FrR TAXATON 606 (1977).
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If the proceeds are payable to the survivor for purchase of the de-
cedent's interest, the proceeds are not includable in the decedent's
gross estate. The value of the business interest is includable at its
stated value.49 This is the rule even in cases in which powers are re-
tained by the decedent pursuant to the reciprocal insurance arrange-
ments, provided that the powers are incident to funding a restrictive
agreement for the purchase of a business associate's interest.50 The
reciprocal trust rule does not apply.51
If the proceeds are payable to the business entity for its purchase
of a decedent associate's business interest pursuant to a restrictive
agreement and no incidents of ownership in the insurance policy are
retained by the decedent, the proceeds are not includable in the de-
cedent's gross estate. The value of the interest is includable in the
estate at its stated value.5 2 Even when the business entity procures
insurance on the lives of its shareholder-partners for a purpose other
than the funding of a restrictive entity-purchase contract, the pro-
ceeds usually are not includable in the decedent's estate if the de-
cedent retains no incidents of ownership.53 However, when the entity
purchases insurance for the acquisition of a deceased associate's in-
terest by other stockholder-partners rather than by the entity itself,
the proceeds are not a general business asset and accordingly are in-
cludable in the decedent's gross estate. 54
This treatment of reciprocal insurance contracts provides a basis
for reform of the current procedure for estate tax valuation of re-
49. See Estate of Ealy v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 431, 433 (1951); Estate of
Riecker v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 1293, 1296 (1944).
50. See Estate of Infante v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 903, 907 (1970), appeal
dismissed, [1971 Transfer Binder] FED. TAXES (P-H) J 101,201 (7th Cir. 1971); Estate of
Fuchs v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 199, 206 (1966), acq. 1967-2 C.B. 2; Estate of Weil v.
Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1267, 1275 (1954), acq. 1955-2 C.B. 10.
51. [W]here a business associate purchased a policy of insurance on the life of the
decedent for the purpose of purchasing the latter's share in the business enterprise,
naming himself, his executors, administrators, or assigns as beneficiary, paying all
premiums thereon and retaining all the incidents of ownership therein until the de-
cedent's death, the proceeds thereof are not includible in the decedents gross estate
even though, at the same time and for the same purpose, the decedent may have
purchased a similar policy of insurance on the life of the business associate.
Rev. Rul. 56-397, 1956-2 C.B. 599, 600.
52. See Estate of Knipp v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 153, 168 (1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 436
(4th Cir. 1957), acq. 1959-1 C.B. 4.
53. I.R.C. § 2042(2) ("key-man insurance" not includable if decedent possessed no in-
cidents of ownership). This does not apply if the decedent was a controlling stockholder
and the insurance proceeds were not received for the benefit of the corporation. Treas.
Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(6), T.D. 7312, 1974-1 C.B. 277, 278.
54. The proceeds are includable in decedent's gross estate because the corporation
has purchased the insurance to meet a personal obligation of the decedent. Treas. Reg.
§ 20-2042-1(b)(1) (1958).
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stricted close corporation and partnership interests. Because of the
intrinsic insurance attributes of restrictive agreements, an appropriate
determinant of an agreement's effect for federal estate tax purposes
is its conformity to the reciprocal insurance paradigm. A requirement
of an insurable pecuniary interest modeled on the existing standards
for testing the insurable interests of partners, combined with inquiries
into the contractual and the factual circumstances surrounding its for-
mation, could be touchstones for granting an agreement conclusive
estate tax effect or for relegating it to the position of one of many
factors55 considered by federal tax authorities and the courts in the
valuation of a close corporation or partnership interest.
A significant difference between restrictive agreements and their
reciprocal insurance counterparts, however, must be kept in mind-
the former contain no explicit provisions for payment of premiums.
Consequently, restrictive agreements should be scrutinized individually
to ensure implicit correspondence with the reciprocal insurance mod-
el. In this way, the objective insurance approach could be adopted
for restrictive agreements without creating a loophole for significant
tax avoidance.
III. The Proposed Reciprocal Insurance Standard
The proposed restrictive agreement standard would require rules
to determine in specific cases whether an agreement is appropriate
for preferential estate tax treatment. This Note proposes a three-part
test based upon the Code's treatment of reciprocal insurance policies.
Under the proposed test, a restrictive agreement would have a con-
clusive effect on estate tax valuation if three criteria were met: the
agreement is enforceable and restrictive, the parties to the agreement
have mutual insurable business interests, and the net effect of the
agreement is that each party's relative economic position is virtually
unchanged. This test should be adopted either as a clarifying amend-
ment to the current regulations or as an addition to the Code itself.
55. See notes 11-13 supra (discussing valuation techniques). The reciprocal insurance
analogy could be useful even in the context of restrictive agreements that are not eligible
for determinative estate tax valuation effect. It is possible to view all restrictive agree-
ments as containing some insurance component. An evaluator could conceivably divide
out this insurance part and give it special recognition while treating the remaining part
under the current system for valuation and estate taxation. This procedure, however,
although the logical consequence of the reciprocal insurance analogy, would probably
be unmanageable by federal tax authorities and courts.
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A. Enforceable and Binding Agreement
The first requirement of the test would coincide with that devel-
oped under existing law. The agreement must be valid and enforce-
able under local state law,50 and the share restrictions binding on
all business associates. Any provision for free alienability of the in-
terest during the parties' lifetime or at death would undermine the
fundamental objectives underlying the restrictive agreement excep-
tion. No favored succession arrangement exists in cases in which a
decedent party's estate can dispose of his interest without restriction
as to buyer or sale price.57 Similarly, if lifetime transferability is un-
limited, the agreement is a purely testamentary document" and does
not serve the business purpose envisioned-promoting harmonious op-
eration of a closely held business by impeding the entry of outsiders.
B. Mutual Insurable Business Interests
In order to prevent the use of the restrictive agreement form for
tax-free testamentary transfers, the proposed standard would require
that stockholder-partners have insurable business interests in the lives
of other stockholder-partners. This approach would avoid the sub-
jective examination of the parties' motives that is necessary under
the current requirement that all such arrangements be reached by
arm's-length negotiation for bona fide business purposes.59 No re-
strictive agreement should be accorded conclusive effect for estate
tax valuation purposes unless the decedent's estate proves a sufficient
interlocking business relationship between the decedent and other
parties to the agreement.
Most jurisdictions require that the insuring partners or partner-
ship have an insurable interest in the insured members of the firm.60
56. See Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955) (restrictive agreements must
be valid and enforceable); Estate of Hammond v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 903
(1954), supplemented by 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 83 (1955) (same).
57. See note 36 supra (restrictive agreements must specify price).
58. See note 37 supra (restrictions required on transfers both during life and at death).
59. See p. 871 supra (discussing difficulty of inquiries into subjective intent). In
United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969), the Court discussed the inherent
difficulties associated with family transfers:
[I]nquiries into subjective intent, especially in intrafamily transfers, are particularly
perilous . . . . [I]t is unrealistic to assume that the settlors of the trusts, usually
members of one family unit, will have created their trusts as a bargained-for ex-
change for the other trust. "Consideration," in the traditional legal sense, simply
does not normally enter into such intrafamily transfers.
Id. at 323-24.
60. See Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Luchs, 108 U.S. 498, 505 (1883); Poland
v. Estate of Fisher, 329 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Mo. 1959); Lakin v. Postal Life & Cas. Ins. Co.,
316 S.W.2d 542, 549 (Mo. 1958).
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An insurable business interest is not automatically presumed from
the mere existence of a partnership relationship. The burden is placed
on the parties to show that the "business relationships ... [are] in-
terlocked and intertwined and . . . for their mutual prosperity, [and
that] they [are] mutually dependent upon each other."6 An insur-
able interest has been found in cases in which the insured partner
has furnished capital for the partnership,6 2 contributed management
skills 63 or technical "know-how,"6 4 or is under a contractual obliga-
tion to provide future capital or services.65 No insurable interest ex-
ists if the insuring partner would gain more pecuniary benefit from
the death of the insured than from his continuing participation in
the partnership. 66
Under a restrictive agreement, the survivors acquire an increased
share in the business upon the death of an associate. Therefore, to
satisfy the business relationship-insurable interest test it must be shown
that the pecuniary loss suffered by the decedent's associates as a result
61. Butterworth v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 240 S.W.2d 676, 680 (Mo. 1951).
62. See Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Luchs, 108 U.S. 498, 505-06 (1883); Cooper's
Adm'r v. Lebus' Adm'rs, 262 Ky. 245, 250, 90 S.W.2d 33, 36 (1935).
63. See Rush v. Howkins, 135 Ga. 128, 128, 68 S.E. 1035, 1035 (1910); Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Morris, 115 N.J. Eq. 142, 144-45, 169 A. 835, 836 (1934).
64. See Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America v. Dow, 174 F.2d 168, 170 (6th Cir. 1949);
Ruth v. Flynn, 26 Colo. App. 171, 181, 142 P. 194, 197 (1914).
65. See Bevin v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 23 Conn. 244, 251-52 (1854). Similar
objective standards have been applied in determining the validity of family partnerships
for income tax purposes. In two early Supreme Court decisions, Commissioner v. Tower,
327 U.S. 280 (1946), and Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293 (1946), two tests of
partnership were developed-capital or services contribution by each partner:
There can be no question that a wife and a husband may, under certain circumstances,
become partners for tax, as for other, purposes. If she either invests capital originat-
ing with her or substantially contributes to the control and management of the
business, or otherwise performs vital additional services, or does all of these things
she may be a partner . . . .But when she does not share in the management and
control of the business, contributes no vital additional service, and where the hus-
band purports in some way to have given her a partnership interest, the Tax Court
may properly take these circumstances into consideration in determining whether
the partnership is real within the meaning of the federal revenue laws.
Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. at 290.
In Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949), the Supreme Court reinterpreted
the Tower and Lusthaus decisions, giving them a more subjective gloss: "The question
is . . . whether, considering all the facts ... the parties in good faith and acting with
a business purpose intended to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise."
Id. at 742; see Lichter v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1111, 1117 (1952); Beck, Use of the
Family Partnership as an Operating Device-The New Regulations, 12 N.Y.U. TAx INsT.
603, 605-06 (1954); Comment, Family Partnerships and the Revenue Act of 1951, 61
YALE L.J. 541, 543 (1952).
66. "The element of wager . .. could serve to deny the right of the partners to a
reciprocal insurable interest... [because] a partner's expectation of benefit or advantage
could lie not in the continuance of the lives of his partners but rather in the possibility
of their deaths prior to his own." Block v. Mylish, 351 Pa. 611, 618, 41 A.2d 731, 735 (1945).
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of his death is not exceeded by the benefits accruing from the restric-
tive agreement. The executor must demonstrate that the decedent and
survivors-beneficiaries of the restrictive agreement had a mutual finan-
cial insurable interest in each other's lives; that is, they had contrib-
uted, or were under a legal obligation to contribute, capital, ser-
vices, or technical expertise to the business association.67
C. Net Economic Effect
In the insurance context, a reciprocal arrangement is valid when-
ever the insurance contract terms are legally binding and the parties'
insurable business interests are mutual. As a result of the contract,
each party acquires a right to future insurance proceeds, contingent
upon his survival. The relative position of each party is unaltered by
the agreement because any health or age discrepancies are equalized
by differences in the actuarily determined premium payments.
No such adjustment occurs in a restrictive agreement. Although
each business associate may have an insurable interest in his fellow
associates, the quantum of that interest may vary significantly. There
is no guarantee that the provisions of the arrangement will have a
similar impact on all parties. Consequently, in order for the restric-
tive agreement to have binding effect for estate tax valuation, the
proposed standard should require that the agreement not alter the
relative financial positions of the parties.68
Under this third criterion, the burden would be on the decedent's
estate to prove that any increased likelihood of a party's survival-
computed actuarily on the basis of such factors as age and health-
is compensated by an increased contribution of capital or services to
the business association. 9 Any enhanced satisfaction to a party who,
67. Contracts for future services or capital represent potential tax avoidance devices
and, as such, must be carefully examined before recognition is granted to a restrictive
agreement. Federal tax authorities and courts must consider all objective evidence in
order to distinguish genuine business commitments from sham contracts.
68. In effect, the second "economic value" requirement of the reciprocal trust rule
established in United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969), is transferred to the
restrictive agreement context. The first "interrelatedness" test is discarded because of
its potential subjectivity. See note 45 supra (discussing Grace rule).
69. It should be emphasized that this is not a "consideration" test, but one based on
the concept of insurance premiums. Consideration for estate tax purposes usually includes
a subjective element. The common statement of the test is "adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth." Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958). Arm's-length
dealings and bona fides are integral components of the consideration test. Here, how-
ever, all evidence of subjective factors is irrelevant and precluded from consideration by
revenue collectors and courts. This is in direct contrast with the approach outlined in
United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 324 n.10 (1969). See note 45 supra (dis-
cussing Grace approach).
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because of his advanced age or majority interest in the business, is
particularly concerned with preventing entry of outsiders into the
firm and settling the succession issue, should be excluded from the
evaluation of net economic effect.
IV. Application of the Reciprocal Insurance Standard
Taxpayer ingenuity has converted the Code's special protective pro-
visions for closely held businesses into widespread estate tax dodges
-most commonly through restrictive agreements and recapitalizations.
The courts have found it difficult to distinguish valid restrictive ar-
rangements from mere tax avoidance devices, particularly in cases in
which there is an age or health discrepancy or familial relationship
between the parties, or in which a preferred stock recapitalization has
been undertaken. Application of the proposed standard to each of
these troublesome problems demonstrates its implementation of the
fundamental Code objectives of promoting succession arrangements
in closely held businesses and minimizing tax avoidance by a man-
ageable and objective test.
A. Application to Leading Cases
Judicial difficulties in determining the estate tax status of restrictive
agreements fall into three general, overlapping categories. The prob-
lems typified by Estate of Macdonald v. Commissioner," Estate of
Littick v. Commissioner,71 and Commissioner v. Bense72 provide ex-
cellent illustrations for the practical application of the proposed re-
ciprocal insurance standard.
1. Age Discrepancy
Courts are often called upon to decide the estate tax effect of re-
strictive arrangements among parties of disparate ages. In Estate of
Macdonald v. Commissioner,78 a healthy seventy-six year old man en-
tered into a stock option contract with his twenty-nine year old grand-
son. The Tax Court, basing its judgment on evidence of intense and
prolonged bargaining, recognized the transfer arrangement as bona
fide, free of donative intent, and negotiated at arm's length.74
Under the new standard, the first question would be whether the
70. Estate of Macdonald v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 1038 (1951).
71. Estate of Littick v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 181 (1958), acq. 1959-2 C.B. 5.
72. Commissioner v. Bensel, 36 B.T.A. 246 (1937), aff'd, 100 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1938).
73. Estate of Macdonald v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 1038 (1951).
74. Id. at 1052-53.
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contract is valid and enforceable under local state law and sufficiently
restrictive as to lifetime and death transfers. Because this test is iden-
tical to that existing under current law, the Macdonald court's anal-
ysis and conclusion that the contract met all local requirements would
also be appropriate under the proposed standard.
The executor would then be required to demonstrate that the par-
ties had insurable business interests in each other's lives. The exact
employment status of the optioner and optionee, and any previous or
promised capital contributions to the business, would be relevant.
The facts of this case indicate that such an insurable business rela-
tionship existed between Macdonald and his grandson. The former
owned the publication business and had worked many years in the
trade publication field.75 After the agreement Macdonald intended to
retain a significant voice in the company's management and to con-
tinue to contribute his demonstrated expertise.7 6 The grandson's con-
tribution to the business included five years of training, eight years
of employment, and a contractual commitment of future capital and
services.1 7
The third requirement, that there be a substantially identical net
economic effect on the parties, would be a significant hurdle. Insofar
as there is a large age differential involved in a Macdonald-type case,
it is improbable that the decedent's executor could demonstrate that
the quantum of services or capital legally promised to the business
by the younger associate offsets the older associate's likely short-term
option concession. Examination of the available facts suggests, how-
ever, that Macdonald might be one of the few cases to satisfy the net
economic effect test. The grandson was judged a key employee and
had spent all of his adult life in the company's service. Moreover, to
secure the option, he had made a legally binding commitment of
future services and capital amounting to $33,000 to be paid over a
short period of time.78 Given the forty-seven year age difference be-
tween the optioner and optionee, however, more evidence would be
required before the Macdonald agreement could be granted deter-
minative estate tax valuation status.
2. Health Discrepancy
When one of the parties to a restrictive agreement is in poor health,
courts find it difficult to decide whether or not the agreement is en-
75. Id. at 1039.
76. Id. at 1053.
77. Id. at 1040, 1052.
78. Id. at 1052.
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titled to estate tax recognition. In Estate of Littick v. Commissioner,T
an incurably ill man entered into a close corporation restrictive agree-
ment with his two brothers. The agreement provided that upon the
death of any of the brothers, the corporation would buy out the de-
ceased brother's interest at a fixed price. The court held that this
arrangement was enforceable for estate tax valuation purposes because,
although "it was likely that Orville would die before his brothers,
[it] was not a foregone conclusion and [his likely death] is not
such a fact as should destroy the validity of the agreement with his
brothers."s 0
Unlike the analysis of this decision, the new model would not fo-
cus on the possible testamentary motivation of the decedent. Instead,
as in the age cases, the proposed standard would test the validity of
the agreement and would require a showing of mutual pecuniary in-
terest among the decedent and his business associates. The agreement
in the Littick case would satisfy these two tests. The court judged
the arrangement to be valid, enforceable, and sufficiently restrictive.81
In addition, the evidence indicates that all three brothers had sub-
stantially equivalent interests in the family-held close corporation.8 2
The third criterion of the proposed standard, the net economic ef-
fect test, would be a virtually insurmountable obstacle to recognition
in an impending death case-it would be highly unlikely, but not im-
possible, that the executor of a decedent's estate could prove sufficient
counterbalancing business contributions or obligations to justify rec-
ognition of an agreement that, when made, would be imminently
consummated. This rigid test would not be met under the facts of
Littick. Littick contains no evidence that the healthy brothers prom-
ised sufficiently greater services or capital to the corporation to ac-
count for the substantial likelihood that they would survive Orville.
Accordingly, the Littick restrictive agreement would be considered
inappropriate for preferential estate tax treatment, and the decedent's
interest would be valued under the current Code's valuation system.8 3
3. Intrafamily Transactions
The most prevalent abuses of the restrictive agreement exception
occur in the familial context. In the prototypical case, a father enters
79. Estate of Littick v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 181 (1958), acq. 1959-2 C.B. 5.
80. Id. at 188.
81. Id. at 185-87.
82. Id. at 182.
83. See p. 865 supra (discussing valuation on basis of all relevant factors).
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into a restrictive transfer arrangement with his son 4 for the sole
purpose of transmitting, at reduced estate tax rates, substantial amounts
of wealth in the guise of a closely held business interest. In such cases
there may be no intention of passing on the business to the son as a
fellow business associate, or even of continuing the business after the
father's death. In this way, the taxpayer gains all the tax advantages
of restrictive agreement recognition without the business purpose jus-
tification for such special estate tax treatment. The following two
examples illustrate the treatment of such agreements under the pro-
posed standard. 5
In Commissioner v. Bensel,8s the majority owner of stock in a close
corporation entered into a restrictive transfer agreement with his son,
a highly priced executive in the company. The court held that the
contractual stated value, rather than the full value, of the father's
shares was the proper amount to be included in the decedent's gross
estate for estate tax purposes. It based its decision on the ann's-length
nature of the agreement, as evidenced by the hostility between father
and son, employment of legal counsel, and protracted negotiations
preceding the agreement.8 7
Although under the new reciprocal insurance standard the result
would be identical, there would be no special scrutiny of the contract
by virtue of the propinquity of the parties as occurs under the cur-
rent standard.88 The decedent's estate would have to establish that
there existed an insurable pecuniary interest between the optioner
and optionee, and that the transferred rights under the restrictive
84. Although the most common case of a restrictive agreement between family mem-
bers is that between father and child, other popular variants are arrangements between
siblings, see, e.g., Hoffman v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 1160 (1943), aff'd on other grounds
sub nom. Giannini v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 285 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 730
(1945); Estate of Littick v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 181 (1958), acq. 1959-2 C.B. 5, between
grandfather and grandchild, see, e.g., Estate of Macdonald v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1038 (1951), and between husband and wife, see, e.g., Estate of Bischoff v. Com-
missioner, 69 T.C. 32 (1977); Estate of Trammell v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 662 (1952), acq.
1955-1 C.B. 6.
85. This Note recognizes the possible validity of family-owned and controlled part-
nerships and corporations, rejecting suggestions that such business associations, because
of their family nature, should be subject to a rebuttable presumption of invalidity for
estate tax purposes. See ALI FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION, RECOMMENDATIONS
ADoPTED BY THE ALI AND REioR1T-Rs STUDIES 157 (1969). Under the reciprocal insurance
standard, restrictive agreements among family members would be accorded the same
effect as those among unrelated parties, provided only that they met the requisite criteria
for conclusiveness.
86. Commissioner v. Bensel, 36 B.T.A. 246 (1937), af'd, 100 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1938).
87. Id. at 249, 253.
88. See note 39 supra.
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agreement left the parties' relative financial positions unchanged.8'
The Bensel case would meet these tests easily. The contributions of
capital and services to the business by the father and son, respectively,
established mutual insurable business interests. Any age differential
between the parties 0 was accounted for by the son's future commit-
ment of his recognized expert services to the company.
On the other hand, a case based loosely on the facts of Commissioner
v. Tower91 might reach a different result. In this example, a man en-
ters into a partnership agreement with his wife whereby upon death
or retirement, the partnership interest of each is transferable only to
the other at an agreed-upon price. The contract is valid, enforceable,
and binding both during life and at death. The parties have approxi-
mately equivalent life expectancies and are both in good health.
Under existing law, a determination of the agreement's status for
estate tax purposes would hinge on the court's view of the subjective
intent of the parties in entering into such an arrangement. Because
of the marital relationship between the partners, the bona fides and
arm's-length tests would be a significant barrier to recognition. 92
Under the new standard, however, because of the approved contract
format and the parties' equal likelihood of survival, the decisive test
would be whether the parties had mutual insurable business inter-
ests. Thus, only if the husband and wife were found to have contrib-
uted substantially identical resources to the business in the form of
capital, participation in the management and control of the business,
expertise, or other vital services would the partnership agreement be
recognized for estate tax valuation purposes.93
89. United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 325 (1969). As in the income tax
partnership cases, there should be rigid insistence that all capital or services contributed
to the business entity be directly traceable to the party in question. See note 65 supra
(discussing capital or services contribution requirement). For example, a restrictive agree-
ment should not be conclusive for estate tax purposes if one party to the agreement has
made a gift of capital contribution to the other party; otherwise, the requirement of mu-
tual insurable business interest would become ineffective.
90. See pp. 880-81 supra (age discrepancy problem).
91. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
92. For many courts, as for the court in Commissioner v. Bensel, 36 B.T.A. 246 (1937),
afrFd, 100 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1938), it would be necessary to produce evidence of marked
hostility between the parties, negotiations through counsel, and unequivocal commitment
of both husband and wife to the joint business. See p. 883 supra (discussing Bensel
decision).
93. If the business association turned out, however, under the objective tests to be a
"dummy partnership" to which one party contributed only funds derived from the other,
was not in the employ of the business, or had no voice in managerial decisions, the
agreement generally would be disregarded in valuation proceedings as a tax avoidance
device.
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B. Application to the Problem of Preferred
Stock Recapitalizations
The restrictive agreement form is only one of many taxpayer schemes
for circumventing federal estate taxation in the closely held business
context. Some of the most prevalent techniques for testamentary dis-
position of assets at reduced estate tax rates are those that divert the
value of future corporate growth to specified individuals (commonly
the natural objects of the transferor's bounty) without any loss of con-
trol. The favored tax avoidance device for achieving this result is the
preferred stock recapitalization, which has become "as standard as the
marital deduction when the proper situation presents itself."94
In the typical preferred stock recapitalization avoidance scheme, the
founder and majority holder of the single class of common stock of
a close corporation undertakes a tax-free recapitalization95 in which
the company cancels its common stock and issues in its place a com-
bination of new redeemable preferred stock and common stock. The
two classes of stock are issued in such proportions as to ensure that
the preferred stock dominates the vote. The preferred stock has an
aggregate value approximating the corporation's value at the time of
the recapitalization and is divided among the shareholders according
to their prior holdings. The new common stock has negligible cur-
rent value and is issued to all other shareholders, including the
founder's donees. As a result of the transaction, the founder retains
voting control and receives preferred stock and the right to its divi-
dends, while the other shareholders acquire all rights to the future
value of the corporation through their ownership of the common stock.
Similar results can be obtained by the use of variations on this model.96
94. Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance,
77 CoLUM. L. Rav. 161, 176 (1977).
95. This can be effected either as a tax-free reorganization of the company pursuant
to I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(E), or as a stock dividend pursuant to I.R.C. § 305. The leading case
in this infrequently litigated area is Estate of Salsbury v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M.(CCH) 1441 (1975). For discussions of the preferred stock recapitalization device, see
Abrams & Morgan, Tax Benefits of Recapitalizing a Closely-Held Corporation, Pac-
TICING LAw., Sept. 1, 1979, at 11; Ehrlich, Corporate Recapitalization as an Estate Planning
Business Retention Tool, 34 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 1661 (1976); Weinberg, Using Preferred
Stock to Solve Close Corporation Continuity Problems, 31 J. TAx. 46 (1969); and Williams,
Using a Recapitalization to Reallocate Equity Interests and Perpetuate Closely Held Status,
32 N.Y.U. TAx INST. 715 (1974).
96. There are two related popular variations on the basic preferred stock recapitaliza-
tion model. By using a similar dual stock structure in a new business venture, see Cooper,
supra note 94, at 176; Kurzman, Estate Planning Considerations on the Organization of
a Business, 34 N.Y.U. TAx INsr. 1433, 1461-62 (1976), the founder of a business can
divert from the outset a significant portion of the value of business growth to his heirs.
Under another approach, an individual's close corporation stock can be transferred to a
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No gift tax is due9" as a result of the transaction, and an estate tax
can be levied only on the value of the founder's limited preferred
stock interest.98 Thus, the closely held business interest is transferred
with little or no gift and estate tax effect.
The foregoing scheme and variations on it are generally accepted
by tax authorities and courts as valid business means for promoting
continuity in closely held businesses.99 If such purported succession
newly created holding company possessing the desired dual stock structure. See Borini,
The Personal Holding Company as an Estate Planning Tool, 26 U. S. CAL. TAX INST.
143, 149-50 (1974); Brennan, The Holding Company: A Creative Estate Planning Tool,
114 TRUSTS & EsT. 716, 716-17 (1975); Oshins & Segal, Freezing Asset Values Need Not
Result in Loss of Control of Business, 6 Esv. PlAN. 322, 323 (1979). This is an invaluable
estate planning tool when, because of the presence of outside shareholders or other
technical problems, recapitalization of an operating company is not feasible. It should
be noted, however, that despite the estate tax advantages of such an arrangement, the
newly created personal holding company will be subject to the stringent income tax rules
set forth in I.R.C. §§ 541-547.
97. See Rev. Rul. 74-269, 1974-1 C.B. 87 (rules for gift tax treatment of preferred
stock recapitalizations). No gift tax is due unless the value of the preferred stock received
by the majority stockholder is less than the surrendered common stock's value. In such
a case, the difference will be treated as a taxable gift under I.R.C. § 2512(b): "[w]here
property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth, then the amount by which the value of the property exceeded the value
of the consideration shall be deemed a gift ...."
Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958) provides a limited exception to the general rule of
taxation of transfers for insufficient consideration. "[A] sale, exchange, or other transfer
of property made in the ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide,
at arm's length, and free from any donative intent), will be considered as made for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth." Id. Some transactions have
been able to fall within the exemption as bona fide plans to transfer control to business
executives. See Messing v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 502, 511 (1967), acq. 1968-1 C.B. 2;
Estate of Anderson v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 706, 718-20 (1947).
98. Under current law, the value of the founder's retained voting control is not in-
cludable for purposes of federal estate taxation of the founder's corporate interest. The
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2009, 90 Stat. 1520, amended the Code
to provide in § 2036(b) for the inclusion in a decedents gross estate of transferred
shares of stock in a controlled corporation if the right to vote the shares either directly
or indirectly is retained by the decedent, thus limiting a device for tax avoidance per-
mitted under prior case law. Cf. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 138 n.13 (1972)
("Although in this case Byrum possessed 'voting control'. .., the concept is too variable
and imprecise to constitute the basis per se for imposing tax liability . . . .'); Estate of
Gilman v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 296, 310 (1975) (shares not includable in gross estate
where decedent retained right to vote as trustee). See generally Clark, Supreme Court
Says Grantor May Retain Voting Control of Stock Placed in Trust, 37 J. TAx. 158
(1972); Moore, Byrum Revisited, 27 U. S. CAL. TAX INsT. 439 (1975); Pressment, Effect
of Tax Court's Gilman Decision on Estate Planning for the Close Corporation, 44 J. TAx.
160 (1976). The recapitalization device, however, apparently does not fall within the
purview of I.R.C. § 2036(b). Voting control is not retained in transferred shares, but is
maintained through ownership of the majority of the newly issued stock.
99. The use of the recapitalization device for close corporation succession purposes
has had the long-standing approval of the courts, beginning with the case of Hartzel
v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 492 (1939), acq. 1939-2 C.B. 16, and approval of the Internal
Revenue Service, see Rev. Rul. 54-13, 1954-1 C.B. 109; Rev. Rul. 55-112, 1955-1 C.B. 344.
Consequently, there have been few IRS challenges of such schemes provided that taxpayers
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devices are analyzed under the proposed reciprocal insurance model,
however, their tax avoidance purpose becomes apparent.
The preferred stock recapitalization (and its progeny) can be re-
styled in the restrictive agreement form. In essence, the initiator of
such a plan enters into a binding option arrangement under which
his interest in a business is transferred to other business associates at
a formulaic or stated value, equaling the value of that interest at the
time of the transaction, paid in the form of preferred stock. 100 As
in the restrictive agreement context, this option price is intended to
be determinative of the value of the transferor's business interest for
estate tax purposes.
The three tests of the proposed reciprocal insurance standard re-
veal the deficiencies of such arrangements. Although recapitalization
plans are generally recognized by courts as valid and enforceable and
are sufficiently restrictive, 01 they may be unacceptable under the
second requirement of the proposed standard. The recapitalization
and other dual stock structure plans can be employed to divert the
value of future business growth to individuals who have little com-
mitment to the affairs of the closely held business. 0 2 Accordingly,
it would be difficult to demonstrate that the transferor and trans-
ferees have mutual insurable business interests. 0 3
Moreover, the net economic effect test is an insuperable barrier to
recognition of the arrangement for estate tax valuation purposes: the
effect of a preferred stock recapitalization is grossly disproportionate
with respect to the parties. This disparity demonstrates the funda-
mental difference between the preferred stock recapitalization and
its restrictive agreement counterpart. The latter is an arrangement for
have complied with the basic rules governing gift and income taxation with respect to
gift tax valuation, see I.R.C. § 2512(b), dividends, see id. §§ 305(b)(3), (c), 306, and re-
organizations, see id. § 368(a)(1)(E).
100. Assuming that the stated dividend rate is equal to the market rate of the in-
terest, the option price is simply the value of the interest, as represented by the pre-
ferred stock principal, without inclusion of an additional amount representing future
dividends. These dividends constitute the earnings of the preferred stock over time; that
is, if all these dividends are discounted to present value, they will equal the current
preferred principal.
101. The restrictive requirement is apparently satisfied, because the transferor must
dispose of his interest to the other owners of the close corporation stock under a binding
plan.
102. See Cooper, supra note 94, at 174 n.25 (estate and gift tax consequences of pre-
ferred stock recapitalization identical regardless of whether or not heir ever participates
in business).
103. In fact, the transferees will usually achieve more benefit from the transferor's
death than from his continued life, since it is only then that the business is free from
the transferor's control and can be sold by the transferees.
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the transfer of a business associate's entire interest in a closely held
business at an agreed-upon price upon his death or retirement. In
the former, only a portion of the owner's interest is being "purchased"
at the stated value. The owner retains control over the corporation's
management in the form of a voting majority of the outstanding stock,
but loses all rights to participation in future profits. The transferees
continue to be minority stockholders, but as a result of the transaction
acquire the entire value of the company's potential growth at the
cost of only the transferor's preferred stock.
In short, preferred stock recapitalization techniques should not be
eligible for special estate tax treatment. They are not designed to
further the two basic legislative and judicial goals involved in the
recognition of restrictive agreements: they fail to ensure continuity
in closely held businesses upon the retirement or death of a business
associate, and they do not prevent unnecessary tax avoidance. These
schemes are instead estate tax dodges disguised in the form of complex
close corporation arrangements.
Conclusion
This Note proposes a reciprocal insurance standard as an appropriate
and feasible method of implementing legislative and judicial objec-
tives in the context of restrictive agreements. By emphasizing the es-
sential insurance characteristics of restrictive agreements, it is pos-
sible to determine the conclusiveness of such arrangements for estate
tax valuation purposes without regard to such troublesome concepts
as "bona fides" and "intent." Past history has demonstrated that tests
based on these indefinite and subjective concepts yield nothing but
inconsistency and confusion.
The proposed test would have distinct advantages over existing
statutory schemes and judicial doctrines. It would provide a definite
and intelligible rule that is manageable by courts, revenue collectors,
and taxpayers. As a result, the reciprocal insurance standard would
facilitate tax and structural planning in closely held businesses, pro-
mote judicial uniformity, and reduce litigation.
